Mississippi College Law Review
Volume 25
Issue 1 Vol. 25 Iss. 1

Article 8

2006

Changing Jurisdiction in Chancery Court
Joseph M. Gianola Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://dc.law.mc.edu/lawreview
Part of the Law Commons

Custom Citation
25 Miss. C. L. Rev. 109 (2005-2006)

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by MC Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Mississippi College Law Review by an authorized editor of MC Law Digital Commons. For more
information, please contact walter@mc.edu.

CHANGING JURISDICTION IN CHANCERY COURT

Joseph M. Gianola, Jr.1
I.

INTRODUCTION

Mississippi is one of three states with separate courts of equity.2 In
light of the Mississippi Supreme Court's recent decisions regarding the subject matter jurisdiction of chancery courts, the time may be now for Mississippi to join forty-seven other states in allowing all equity matters to be
heard in circuit court. The Mississippi Supreme Court, in one of its most
recent opinions on this issue, decided that the chancery court did not have
jurisdiction over a suit involving two equitable actions and three claims for
equitable relief.' Not only does the decision limit the matters that chancery
courts can hear, but the case also calls into question matters of pendent
jurisdiction, plaintiff's right to choose the forum, and perhaps the need to
remove equity matters exclusively to circuit court.
II.

INSTANT CASE:

UNION NATIONAL LIFE INSURANCE CO. V. CROSBY

Over 350 plaintiffs, including Jacqueline Crosby, filed suit against
Union National Life Insurance Company, United Insurance Company of
America, Union National Fire Insurance Company, and their agents, from
whom the plaintiffs had bought fire, life, and/or health insurance policies.4
The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants created policies to sell to lowincome, uneducated, and unsophisticated individuals, and that the policies
charged premiums that were extremely high in relation to the potential
benefits to the plaintiffs and the risks to the defendants.5 They also alleged
that the premiums were expensive; the benefits were minimal and non-increasing; and the insureds were required to pay premiums after the premiums had exceeded the cash values of the policies or they would lose what
they had previously paid.6 The plaintiffs brought the action claiming fraud,
fraudulent inducement, breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing, tortious breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, assumpsit, unjust enrichment, negligence, gross negligence, multiple violations of the Mississippi
Consumer Protection Act, and conversion.7 They sought relief in the forms
1. Joseph M. Gianola, Jr. (jgianola@rbisf.com) is currently an associate with Robinson, Biggs,
Ingram, Solop & Farris, PLLC and thanks Professor Jeffrey Jackson for his supervision in writing this
Comment.
2. Morton Gitelman, The Separation of Law and Equity and the Arkansas Chancery Courts:

HistoricalAnomalies and PoliticalRealities, 17 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 215, 244 (1995);
amend. 80 (2001).
3. Union Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Crosby, 870 So. 2d 1175 (Miss. 2004).
4. Id. at 1178.
5. Id. at 1179.
6. Id. at 1178.
7. Id.

ARK. CONST.
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of a constructive trust, accounting, injunctive relief, actual damages, and
punitive damages.8
The case was filed in the Chancery Court of Covington County with
Chancellor Larry Buffington presiding. 9 Union National filed a motion to
transfer the case to circuit court, claiming that the chancery court did not
have subject matter jurisdiction."0 Chancellor Buffington denied Union
National's motion to transfer, and the Mississippi Supreme Court granted
Union National's request for an interlocutory appeal.1 On interlocutory
appeal, the court was to determine whether the suit was based in tort and
contract or in equity. 12 The court considered each claim and relief sought
whether the chancery court had jurisdiction to
separately in 1determining
3
case.
the
hear
Although the court found that two of the five claims and three of the
five remedies were based in equity, the court decided that "[i]t is more
appropriate for a circuit court to hear equity claims than it is for a chancery
court to hear actions at law since the circuit courts have general jurisdiction
but chancery courts enjoy only limited jurisdiction.' 4 The court also expressed some concern that the defendants' "right to trial by jury would be
infringed upon if th[e] case w[ere] heard in chancery court."' 5 It also based
its decision on a "substance over form" view of the complaint, stating, "[a]
realistic and pragmatic review of the complaint leads us to the conclusion
that this is a lawsuit that should be [heard] in circuit court, not chancery
court."' 6 In light of the "substance over form" argument, the court declared that the equitable claims and relief sought "arise from the sale and
alleged breach of an insurance contract[,]" not from the sale, administration, and service of the contract.' 7 Based upon these principles, the court
decided the complaint was based predominantly in tort and contract, and
that Union National's motion to transfer should have been granted. 8
III.

BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF THE LAW

When addressing the subject matter jurisdiction of chancery court,
most judicial discussions begin with the Mississippi Constitution, which
states:
The chancery court shall have full jurisdiction in the following matters and cases, viz.: (a) All matters in equity; (b) Divorce and alimony; (c) Matters testamentary and of
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Id. at 1178-79.
Id. at 1178.
Id.
Id. See Miss. R. App. P. 5.
Crosby, 870 So. 2d at 1178.
Id. at 1178-82.
Id. at 1182 (quoting S. Leisure Homes, Inc. v. Hardin, 742 So. 2d 1088, 1090 (Miss. 1999)).
Id. at 1181.
Id.

17.

Id.

18. Id. at 1182 (Justice Easley dissented; Justice Diaz did not participate).
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administration; (d) Minor's business; (e) Cases of idiocy, lunacy, and persons of unsound mind; (f) All cases of which
the said court had jurisdiction under the laws in force when
this Constitution is put in operation.' 9
The earlier cases interpreted the constitution liberally. In search of a standard to apply, the Mississippi Supreme Court in one of its earlier opinions
stated:
It is settled beyond question in this jurisdiction that where a
suit is brought in the chancery court and the court takes jurisdiction on any one ground of equity, it will proceed in the
one suit to a complete adjudication and settlement of every
one of all the several disputed questions materially involved
in the entire transaction, awarding by a single comprehensive decree all appropriate remedies, legal as well as equitable, although all the other questions involved would
otherwise be purely of legal cognizance; and if the ground of
equity fails under the proof the cause may be retained to a
complete final decree on the remaining issues, although the
latter present legal subjects only and the decree would cover
only legal rights and grant none but legal remedies.2"
About thirty years later, the court attempted to enforce this standard
by stating, "if any aspect of the case lay within [the chancery court's] subject matter jurisdiction, the chancery court ha[s] authority to hear and adjudge any non-chancery pure law claims via pendent jurisdiction."21 Only a
year later the court emphasized this notion by stating that jurisdiction is to
be determined from the face of a well-pleaded complaint, and if there is an
independent basis for jurisdiction, the chancery court may hear any pendent legal claims.22 Despite the indication that a case need be grounded
only in any aspect of equity, the court at times was persuaded to transfer a
23
case to circuit court to avoid violating someone's "right to trial by jury.
Recently, the court has taken a stricter approach in addressing matters
of jurisdiction in chancery court. In 1999, the court granted the movant's
motion to transfer to circuit court "[a]lthough acts of fraud may give rise to
actions in equity .... 4 In that case, the court looked to the nature of the
remedy sought, stating that such relief as actual and punitive damages are
clearly legal remedies and not equitable in nature.
This view was affirmed when the court in a different case indicated that the request for an
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

MIsS. CONST. art. 6, § 159.
Shaw v. Owen, 90 So. 2d 179, 181 (Miss. 1956).
Johnson v. Hinds County, 524 So. 2d 947, 953 (Miss. 1988).
Tillotson v. Anders, 551 So. 2d. 212, 213 (Miss. 1989).
See id. at 214; Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Hasty, 360 So. 2d 925, 927 (Miss. 1978).
S. Leisure Homes, Inc. v. Hardin, 742 So. 2d 1088, 1099 (Miss. 1999).
Id.

MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 25:109

equitable remedy would not always invoke the subject matter jurisdiction
of the chancery court.26 The court decided that seeking the remedy of accounting coupled with monetary relief does not give the chancery court
jurisdiction. 7
The jurisdiction of chancery courts was further limited when the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed a chancery judge's decision and ordered a
case involving a minor seeking equitable remedies in the forms of a temporary restraining order, an accounting, and injunctive relief in three areas to
be transferred to circuit court.2 8 Despite the plaintiff's status as a minor
and the equitable relief sought, the court in a five-to-four decision stated
that all claims arising under the Tort Claims Act are to be heard exclusively
in circuit court.29 Justice McRae wrote a dissent emphasizing that once the
chancery court has initial jurisdiction, it has pendent jurisdiction to hear all
legal claims even if the equitable claims are disposed of before trial.3"
At times, the Mississippi Supreme Court has tended to overlook its
past decisions and has decided such matters on a case-by-case basis. In
Poole v. Gwin, Lewis & Punches, LLP, a law firm that had represented
Poole in a property settlement brought suit in chancery court in an attempt
to recover fees under a contingency fee arrangement with Poole.3 1 Although the case looked like a simple breach-of-contract case, the court
stepped over the breach-of-contract issue by stating that the attorney-client
relationship is a contract at will, and the discharge of a client's attorney is
not a breach of contract. 32 However, the facts do not indicate that the attorney was ever discharged.33 They do state that Poole and the Drouet
family entered into a settlement agreement, and when Poole was later committed to the Mississippi State Hospital,3 4 the attorneys sought to collect
their percentage of the settlement.3 5
On interlocutory appeal, the court found that a contingency fee contract creates an equitable assignment under Mississippi law. 36 The court
declined to accept the Fifth Circuit precedent3 7 that decided that actions in
38
quantum meruit are actions at law because they seek money damages.
Instead, it chose to follow the dissent in Webb v. B.C. Rogers Poultry, Inc.,
noting that actions in quantum meruit are rooted in chancery court.3 9
26. Briggs & Stratton Corp. v. Smith, 854 So. 2d 1045 (Miss. 2003).
27. Id. It is also worth noting that the Mississippi Supreme Court has basically done away with
accounting by making it a discovery matter. See City of Ridgeland v. Flowers, 846 So. 2d 210, 214
(Miss. 2003); Union Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Crosby, 870 So. 2d 1175, 1180 (Miss. 2004).
28. City of Ridgeland, 846 So. 2d at 212.
29. Id. at 214.
30. Id. at 215.
31. Poole v. Gwin, Lewis & Punches, LLP, 792 So. 2d 987, 988-89 (Miss. 2001).
32. Id. at 989-90.
33. Id. at 989.
34. Mississippi State Hospital is the publicly funded psychiatric facility at Whitfield.
35. Poole, 792 So. 2d at 989.
36. Id. at 990.
37. Webb v. B.C. Rogers Poultry, Inc., 174 F.3d 697, 704-05 (5th Cir. 1999).
38. Poole, 792 So. 2d at 991.
39. Id.
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When Poole asserted her right to trial by jury, the court stated, "there is no
right to trial by jury in chancery court. 'The Constitution and the rules
pertaining to jury trial have no effect in Chancery Court unless a particular
statute requires a jury." 4 Justice Mills, in his dissent, pointed out that the
case was nothing other than a breach-of-contract case despite the attorneyclient relationship, and he emphasized Poole's right to trial by jury.41
Less than one year before Crosby was decided, the court, in Re/Max
Real Estate Partners,Inc. v. Lindsley,4 2 held that the request for an accounting of funds arising out of a breach of contract was sufficient to sustain
jurisdiction in chancery court.4 3 Reverting back to the original standard,
the court stated, "where there is in a case one issue of exclusive equity
cognizance, such an issue can bring the entire case within [the] subject matter jurisdiction of [the] chancery court and that court may proceed to adjudicate all legal issues as well."4 4 The court further stated that to determine
whether a claim for an accounting is equitable, one must see if discovery is
needed, whether it is complicated, and whether a fiduciary duty exists.4 5
The court denied the right to trial by jury in reliance on Poole and determined that the plaintiff's right to choose his/her forum outweighed the
right to trial by jury.46 Despite only a single claim based in equity, the
court decided that the chancery court had jurisdiction over the accounting
claim and pendent jurisdiction over all other legal matters.4 7 Four justices
dissented. The dissenting opinion, written by Justice Waller, suggested that
the mere request for accounting does not confer jurisdiction in chancery
court.4 8

Disputes over subject matter jurisdiction arose in two other cases
where Judge Larry Buffington asserted chancery court jurisdiction. The
first was a wrongful death action brought under the Tort Claims Act
against Mississippi Municipal Liability Plan (MMLP). 4 9 Judge Buffington
entered an opinion and order finding that MMLP coverage was for
$500,000 and not $50,000.50 On appeal to the Mississippi Supreme Court,
MMLP asserted that the chancery court did not have jurisdiction to hear
the case despite the fact that it had failed to raise the jurisdictional defect
before the chancery court. 5 ' The court recognized that when a party fails
to raise an issue at the trial court level it is barred from raising that issue on
40.

Id. at 990 (quoting BILLY G. BRIDGES & JAMES W. SHELSON, GRIFFITH'S MISSISSIPPI CHAN-

§ 597, at 438 (2000)).
Poole, 792 So. 2d at 992.
Re/Max Real Estate Partners, Inc. v. Lindsley, 840 So. 2d 709 (Miss. 2003).
Id. at 714.
Id. at 712.
Id.
Id. at 713.
Id. at 714.
Id. at 714-15.
Miss. Mun. Liab. Plan v. Jordan, 863 So. 2d 934, 936 (Miss. 2003).
Id. at 937.
Id. at 940.

CERY PRACTICE

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
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appeal, but if the chancery court has committed "plain error" and a substantial right is affected, then grounds exist to reverse the earlier decision.52
The other case arose from a breach of contract between Copiah Medical Associates (Copiah) and Mississippi Baptist Health Systems (Baptist).
Copiah filed an action in circuit court for damages and declaratory relief.
Baptist then filed an action for specific performance in chancery court.53
On interlocutory appeal, the Mississippi Supreme Court was to decide if
Judge Buffington had correctly denied Copiah's motion to transfer to circuit court.5 4 The court decided that the denial to transfer was improper
since specific performance of a lease contract could not be awarded by the
chancery court due to the need for continual monitoring of the lease by the
chancery court. The court stated that the trial court must look to the
substance of the claim over its form to determine if the claim is legal or
equitable, and "if some doubt exists as to whether a complaint is legal or
equitable in nature, that case is better tried in circuit court."5 6

IV.

ANALYSIS

In light of Crosby and other recent cases, a standard for determining
subject matter jurisdiction in chancery court in Mississippi has become very
unclear and rather restrictive. The standard in Shaw v. Owen,5 7 which
stated that the chancery court had pendent jurisdiction over all other
claims once it took jurisdiction based on one ground of equity, is clearly
not operative today. 58 Also, cases that required only an equitable jurisdictional basis from the face of a well-pleaded complaint do not seem
applicable.
Recently, the court has increasingly taken a "substance over form" approach to determining whether a claim and the relief sought are legal or
equitable.5 9 This subjective approach requires the chancellor to view the
complaint from the plaintiff's perspective and determine whether the claim
and remedy sought are really equitable or legal in nature. Such a "substance over form" approach makes one wonder whether the tobacco litigation in chancery court was really about enjoining the tobacco
manufacturers or about the billions of dollars sought to reimburse the
Medicaid funds.6" Was the litigation in Poole6 really an action for an equitable assignment and quantum meruit or an action for damages for breach
of contract? After all, "if some doubt exists as to whether a complaint is
52. Id. at 940-41.
53. Copiah Med. Assocs. v. Miss. Baptist Health Sys., 898 So. 2d 656, 659 (Miss. 2005).
54. Id. at 660.
55. Id. at 660-61.
56. Id. at 661.
57. Shaw v. Owen, 90 So. 2d 179 (Miss. 1956).
58. Crosby involved two claims and three remedies based in equity.
59. Copiah Med. Assocs. v. Miss. Baptist Health Sys., 898 So. 2d 656, 661 (Miss. 2005). See also
Union Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Crosby, 870 So. 2d 1175, 1182 (Miss. 2004). (The court stated that it should
take a realistic and pragmatic review of the complaint.)
60. See In re Corr-Williams Tobacco Co., 691 So. 2d 424 (Miss. 1997).
61. Poole v. Gwin, Lewis & Punches, LLP, 792 So. 2d 987 (Miss. 2001).
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' '6 2 and
legal or equitable in nature, that case is better tried in circuit court
"a breach of contract claim . . . is best heard in circuit court. ' 63

The Crosby opinion was written less that one year after Lindsley, but
the two are hardly reconcilable. Lindsley involved only one equitable
claim 64 while Crosby involved five.65 The two distinctly different opinions
may be a result of the absence of Justice McRae in the Crosby decision.
Since Lindsley was a five-to-four opinion, the result would probably not be
the same today with the additions of Justices Dickinson and Carlson to the
court. However, the difference might also have overtones of the possible
frustrations the court has had with the exercise of jurisdiction Judge Buffington has asserted in the past.6 6
The Mississippi Supreme Court's approach to the issue leads one to
believe that the standard is (1) to look to where the complaint "arises
from, ' 67 (2) to determine if the claim or remedies sought are predominately equitable,6 8 and (3) if doubt exists, "[i]t is more appropriate for a
circuit court to hear equity claims than it is for a chancery court to hear
actions at law."6 9 The results of such a standard reach far beyond the outcome in each case decided. The decisions indicate an erosion of pendent
jurisdiction in chancery court, a limit on the venues among which plaintiffs
may choose, and a merging of the chancery and circuit courts in Mississippi.
Since the Mississippi Supreme Court is abandoning the notion that if
the chancery court exercises jurisdiction based on one ground of equity
then the court may hear all associated legal claims, pendent jurisdiction in
chancery court has been extremely limited. This particularly infringes upon
the plaintiff's right to choose the forum.7 0 If a plaintiff were allowed to
bring only his equitable claims in chancery court and his legal claims in
circuit court, then limiting the pendent jurisdiction of chancery courts
would not be a problem. However, this option is not available due to the
doctrine of res judicata.7 1 The doctrine bars the litigation of two claims if
the two actions involve similar subject matter, the facts are similar, the parties are the same, and the quality or character of the person whom the
claim is against is the same.72 Between this doctrine and the Mississippi
Supreme Court's recent decisions, the pendent jurisdiction of chancery
courts has deteriorated.
62. Copiah Med. Assocs., 898 So. 2d at 661.
63. S. Leisure Homes, Inc. v. Hardin, 742 So. 2d 1088, 1090 (Miss. 1999).
64. Re/Max Real Estate Partners, Inc. v. Lindsley, 840 So. 2d 709 (Miss. 2003).
65. Union Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Crosby, 870 So. 2d 1175, 1178-79 (Miss. 2004).
66. See Miss. Mun. Liab. Plan v. Jordan, 863 So. 2d 934, 934 (Miss. 2003); Copiah Med. Assocs.,
898 So. 2d at 656.
67. Crosby, 870 So. 2d at 1182.
68. See id. (The court addressed each claim and remedy separately and determined whether
there was more legal or equitable weight).
69. Id. at 1182 (quoting S. Leisure Homes, Inc. v. Hardin, 742 So. 2d 1088, 1090 (Miss. 1999).
70. See New Orleans & Ne. R.R. Co. v. Gable, 172 So. 2d 421 (Miss. 1965).
71. See AETNA v. Berry, 669 So. 2d 56 (Miss. 1996).
72. Id. at 67.
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Over the past few years, Mississippi has limited the forums in which
plaintiffs may bring their cases. Recently Mississippi amended the comments to Rule 20 of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure, which now
allows joinder only when the "transaction or occurrence" is a "distinct litigable event."7 3 The new joinder rule is narrower than the previous one. It
limits who can be sued and where plaintiffs may bring suit. The federal
courts already had this narrower rule in place,7 4 forcing plaintiffs to bring
such actions in two different systems. Now a plaintiff who seeks equitable
relief coupled with legal relief has a much greater burden convincing a
chancellor, or the Mississippi Supreme Court, that the chancery court has
jurisdiction to hear the claims.
As of 1995, only four states still had separate courts of equity: Mississippi, Arkansas, Delaware, and Tennessee.7 5 However, in 2001, Arkansas
passed Amendment 80 to its constitution, which eliminated chancery courts
throughout the state.7 6 Arkansas completely merged the two court systems
and created divisions within the circuit courts to distribute the caseload
accordingly. 77 Mississippi remains one of three states that still have separate courts of equity. Mississippi does not need to merge the courts, but it
should consider eliminating the constitutional provision that allows the
chancery court to hear "all matters in equity. ' 7 Such an amendment
would limit the chancery court's jurisdiction to basically domestic issues.
The amendment would eliminate all the litigation over the jurisdiction of
the courts and the interlocutory appeals to Mississippi Supreme Court.
Placing all these cases in circuit court guarantees all litigants a right to trial
by jury and shields parties from overreaching chancellors.
V.

CONCLUSION

The standard that the Mississippi Supreme Court uses to determine
the jurisdiction of the chancery courts is very cloudy and inconsistently applied. Recently, the court's application of the law has severely limited the
chancery court's jurisdiction and deteriorated the court's pendent jurisdiction to hear all other claims. Because of this and the other changes to the
law in Mississippi, a plaintiff's choice of forum is continually being restricted. In light of the recent opinions, it may be time for the state and the
judicial system to consider an amendment that would simply defer all matters of equity to circuit courts and retain the chancery courts as family
courts or divorce courts.

73. Miss. R. Civ. P. 20, cmt. (2004).
74. FED. R. Civ. P. 20 (2005).
75. Morton Gitelman, The Separation of Law and Equity and the Arkansas Chancery Courts:
HistoricalAnomalies and Political Realities, 17 U. ARK. LITILE ROCK L.J. 215, 244 (1995).
76.

ARK. CONST. amend. 80 (2001).

77. Larry Brady & J.D. Gingerich, A Practitioner'sGuide to Arkansas's New JudicialArticle, 24
U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 715, 719-20 (2002).
78. MIss. CONST. art. 6, § 159.

